Frequently Asked Questions

Questions

The following section lists individual questions.

How do I generate a client identifier or client secret?

We strongly recommend the following guidelines for generating a client identifier or client secret:

  1. Each client should have a unique identifier and secret pair.
  2. Each identifier and secret should be randomly generated.
  3. Each identifier and secret should have a length above 40 characters.
  4. The secret should be stored in the configuration in a supported hash format. Note: This does not mean you configure the relying party / client application with a hashed secret, the hashed secret should just be used for the client_secret value in the Authelia client configuration and the relying party / client application should have the plain text secret.
  5. Identifiers and Secrets should only have RFC3986 Unreserved Characters as some implementations do not appropriately encode the identifier or secret when using it to access the token endpoint. See Why does Authelia return an error about the client identifier or client secret being incorrect when they are correct FAQ on this specific issue for more information.

Authelia provides an easy way to perform such actions.

Client ID / Identifier

Users can easily generate a client id / identifier by following the Generating a Random Alphanumeric String guide. For example users can perform the below command to generate a client id / identifier with 72 characters which is printed. This random command also avoids issues with a relying party / client application encoding the characters correctly as it uses the RFC3986 Unreserved Characters.

If a different charset is used if the value would be different when URL encoded then it will also print this value separately.

Client Secret

Users can easily generate a client secret by following the Generating a Random Password Hash guide. For example users can perform the below command to both generate a client secret with 72 characters which is printed and is to be used with the relying party and hash it using PBKDF2 which can be stored in the Authelia configuration. This random command also avoids issues with a relying party / client application encoding the characters correctly as it uses the RFC3986 Unreserved Characters.

If a different charset is used if the value would be different when URL encoded then it will also print this value separately.

Tuning work factors

When hashing the client secrets, Authelia performs the hashing operation to authenticate the client when receiving requests. This hashing operation takes time by design (the work part of the work factor) to hinder an attacker trying to obtain the client secret. The amount of time taken depends on your hardware and the work factor.

If your client operations time out, you might need to reduce the work factor to a level appropriate for your client and your hardware’s capabilities.

To test the duration of different work factors, you can measure it like this: time authelia crypto hash generate pbkdf2 --variant sha512 --iterations 310000 --password insecure_password.

Note

You should not use your actual passwords for this test, the time taken should be the same for any reasonable password length.

You can read more about password hashing tuning in the Passwords reference guide.

Plaintext

Authelia technically supports storing the plaintext secret in the configuration. This will likely be completely unavailable in the future as it was a mistake to implement it like this in the first place. While some other OpenID Connect 1.0 providers operate in this way, it’s more often than not that they operating in this way in error. The current technical support for this is only to prevent massive upheaval to users and give them time to migrate.

As per RFC6819 Section 5.1.4.1.3 the secret should only be stored by the authorization server as hashes / digests unless there is a very specific specification or protocol that is implemented by the authorization server which requires access to the secret in the clear to operate properly in which case the secret should be encrypted and not be stored in plaintext. The most likely long term outcome is that the client configurations will be stored in the database with the secret both salted and peppered.

Authelia currently does not implement any of the specifications or protocols which require secrets being accessible in the clear such as most notably the client_secret_jwt grant, we will however likely soon implement client_secret_jwt. We are however strongly discouraging and formally deprecating the use of plaintext client secrets for purposes outside those required by specifications. We instead recommended that users remove this from their configuration entirely and use the How Do I Generate a Client Identifier or Client Secret FAQ.

Plaintext is either denoted by the $plaintext$ prefix where everything after the prefix is the secret. In addition if the secret does not start with the $ character it’s considered as a plaintext secret for the time being but is deprecated as is the $plaintext$ prefix.

Why does Authelia return an error about the client identifier or client secret being incorrect when they are correct?

When using client_secret_basic several implementations of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect 1.0 do not properly URL encode these values as is absolutely required by the specification before encoding the header value. Both the client id and client secret must be encoded using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded encoding algorithm (i.e. URL encoded) before being used as the username and password values for the Basic authorization scheme as detailed in RFC6749 Section 2.3.1.

Authelia enforces this practice. In situations where the client does not conform to the specification we suggest ensuring the client id and client secret only use the unreserved characters or you URL encode these values yourself.

For these reasons since v4.38.0 Authelia has included a URL encoded value when generating random strings or password hashes if the URL encoded value differs from the non-encoded value.

Why isn’t my application able to retrieve the token even though I’ve consented?

The most common cause for this issue is when the affected application can not make requests to the Token Endpoint. This becomes obvious when the log level is set to debug or trace and a presence of requests to the Authorization Endpoint without errors (i.e. returns a success) but an absence of requests made to the Token Endpoint.

These requests can be identified by looking at the path field in the logs, or by messages prefixed with Authorization Request indicating a request to the Authorization Endpoint and Access Request indicating a request to the Token Endpoint. Therefore if the logs indicate there was an Authorization Request and Access Request this specific scenario is not applicable to you.

All causes should be clearly logged by the client application, and all errors that do not match this scenario are clearly logged by Authelia. It’s not possible for us to log requests that never occur however.

One potential solution to this is detailed in the Solution: Configure DNS Appropriately section. This section also details how to identity if you’re affected.

Why doesn’t the discovery endpoint return the correct issuer and endpoint URL’s?

The most common cause for this is if the X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host / Host headers do not match the fully qualified URL of the provider. This can be because of requesting from the Authelia port directly i.e. without going through your proxy or due to a poorly configured proxy.

If you’ve configured Authelia alongside a proxy and are making a request directly to Authelia you need to perform the request via the proxy. If you’re avoiding the proxy due to a DNS limitation see Solution: Configure DNS Appropriately section.

Why doesn’t the access control configuration work with OpenID Connect 1.0?

The access control configuration contains several elements which are not very compatible with OpenID Connect 1.0. They were designed with per-request authorizations in mind. In particular the resources, query, methods, and networks criteria are very specific to each request and to some degree so are the domain and domain regex criteria as the token is issued to the client not a specific domain.

For these reasons we implemented the authorization policy as a direct option in the client. It’s likely in the future that we’ll expand this option to encompass the features that work well with OpenID Connect 1.0 such as the subject criteria which reasonably be matched to an individual authorization policy. Because the other criteria are mostly geared towards per-request authorization these criteria types are fairly unlikely to become part of OpenID Connect 1.0 as there are no ways to apply these criteria except during the initial authorization request.

See ADR1 for more information.

Why isn’t the Access Token a JSON Web Token?

The Access Token and it’s format is entirely up to Authorization Servers / OpenID Connect 1.0 Providers. The conventional way the Access Token is presented is as an opaque value which has no meaning. There are quite a few reasons this is the case, however standards and implementations exist which return the Access Token as a JSON Web Token. This is not specifically wrong when they do this, just as the standards allow us to decide the value should be opaque it also allows them to decide not to do that.

The double-edged sword of a JSON Web Token is it’s easy to perform a stateless check to see if a JSON Web Token is “valid” but also very hard to revoke it. A Resource Server may just check the JWT claims and signature to see if it looks like it should still be valid, without performing a stateful check with the Authorization Server frequently enough. This is why we strongly recommend that Access Tokens and ID Tokens have a short lifespan.

There also exists standardized mechanisms for Resource Servers and those possessing an opaque Access Token to check the validity and metadata associated with them. These mechanisms are the Introspection Request and UserInfo Request.

There are some other specific scenarios which would lead to the Access Token being revoked earlier than its original lifetime which make this desirable. When you combine these with the fact there are standardized mechanisms to have a similar outcome, it’s obvious to us this is the sane default.

For example during a Refresh Flow to the Token Endpoint the previously issued Access Token and Refresh Token should be transparently revoked. This means as soon as a Refresh Flow is performed either by the authorized party or a malicious one who’s nefariously obtained the Refresh Token, the old Access Token and Refresh Token are effectively useless unless the Resource Server is caching these results.

In addition as tokens can be manually revoked using the Revocation Endpoint in a scenario where a long lived token was revoked due to known compromise; the revocation will take place much faster.

Users who still desire or have an application that requires the Access Token is a JWT should configure the access_token_signed_response_alg client configuration option.

There are several in-use methodologies for linking user accounts ot OpenID Connect 1.0 Providers. The specification has a fairly strong opinion about how this is done for various reasons and the supported method by Authelia is the same as what the specification supports.

Specifically we support using the combination of the iss and sub claim as an anchor to local user accounts. This combination is a combination that must be unique for any given user identity. Claims such as email and preferred_username have no formal guarantees of stability by the OpenID Connect 1.0 specification.

Several in-use applications including ones that Authelia users frequently use utilize claims such as email and preferred_username. However these implementations are in contradiction with the specification. These attributes realistically should only be used as hints when a user who has not linked their account tries to login with OpenID Connect 1.0 and has not logged in yet. For example an application may prefill the username or email field of a login or registration form using these claims.

Utilization of these claims could potentially become problematic if we ever implement a feature to change usernames or email addresses. Therefore we only guarantee the stability of those specific claims and at such a time as we allow changing of usernames or email addresses the link between those values will remain stable, any other claim is to be considered fragile.

If interested in the specification you can read the Claim Stability and Uniqueness section of the specification.

Solutions

The following section details solutions for multiple of the questions above.

Configure DNS Appropriately

In order to make requests to Authelia an application must be able to resolve it. It’s important in all instances to check if the application with the issue can resolve the correct IP address for Authelia between each step of the process, and this check also can be used to clearly identity if this is the most likely underlying cause for an issue you’re facing.

Bare-Metal
  1. If you’re running an internal DNS server ensure an A record exists for the FQDN of Authelia with the value being the IP of the server responsible for handling requests for Authelia.
  2. If you’re not running an internal DNS server then do check the following:
    1. Ensure the external DNS server(s) have the same A record as described above.
    2. Ensure that that your NAT-hairpin is configured correctly.
    3. If all else fails add a hosts file entry to work around this issue.
Docker
  1. Ensure both the application with the issue shares a network in common with the proxy container.
  2. Ensure an alias for the FQDN of Authelia is present for the proxy container:
    • If using docker compose see the network aliases documentation reference for more information.
    • If using docker run see the --network-alias option of the docker run reference for more information.

Examples (assuming your Authelia Root URL is https://auth.example.com):

docker-compose.yml
services:
  application:
    ## Mandatory that the application is on the same network as the proxy.
    networks:
      proxy: {}
  proxy:
    networks:
      ## Mandatory that the proxy is on the same network as the application, and that it has this alias.
      proxy:
        aliases:
          - 'auth.example.com'
  authelia:
    networks:
      proxy: {}
networks:
  proxy:
    ## An external network can be created manually and shared between multiple compose files. This is NOT mandatory.
    external: true
    name: 'proxy-net'
docker run -d --name proxy --network proxy --network-alias auth.example.com <other proxy arguments>
docker run -d --name application --network proxy <other application arguments>